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COMMENTS
THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT IN
VIRGINIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Due to the dramatic rise over the last decade in the number of child
custody disputes between parents who are geographically separated, courts
increasingly are faced with interstate litigation and its attendant legal and
emotional problems.' Because foreign state custody decrees traditionally
have been viewed as modifiable and therefore have not been accorded the
respect given to final decrees, 2 parents who lose in one state have been
encouraged to seek a more favorable forum in a second state. By employing
such self-help methods as "child snatching,"' a parent can avail himself
of a second day in court.
The victims of these interstate battles are, of course, the children who
are faced with the very real possibility of being shifted from one home to
another, either with or without the court's sanction. Recognizing the essential need for stability and continuity in the life of a child who is affected
by divorce,4 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws
formulated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in 1968.1
Virginia's adoption of the UCCJA, effective January 1, 1980,6 with the aid
and cooperation of the other thirty-seven states that have adopted the
Act,7 should help put an end to forum shopping and continuing litigation
1. Bodenheimer, ProgressUnder the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L.
REV. 978 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, Problems]. Professor Bodenheimer
served as Reporter during the drafting of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Common problems in an interstate custody battle include conflicting decrees from different
states, child stealing and concealment, and refusal by the noncustodial parent to return the
child after an out-of-state visitation. Id.
2. See notes 128-134 infra, and accompanying text.
3. "Child snatching" occurs when "divorced or separated parents . . . kidnap their own
children during or after .. .custody fights." Kidnappings: A Family Affair, NEWSWEEK,
October 18, 1976, at 24.
4. See generally UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory
Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANm. 111, 112 (1979); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SoLNrr, BEYOND
TH BEST INTERESTS OF Tm CmLD 37-39 (1973).
5. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AT, 9 UNIFoM LAWS ANN. 111 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORM AT].
6. 1979 Va. Acts, c. 229, codified as VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Cum. Supp. 1979).

7. States having adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the year of adoption, and the statutory reference are as follows: Alaska, 1977, ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010 to
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in child custody disputes.
This note will briefly describe the scope and purposes of the UCCJA and
its major provisions and will discuss how the UCCJA affects statutory and
case law in Virginia.
HI.

THE SCOPE AND BASIC PURPOSES OF THE

UCCJA

The UCCJA is almost exclusively concerned with the procedural interstate workings of child custody proceedings. 8 Once its jurisdictional prerequisites have been complied with, the Act does not prescribe the subjective
weighing of factors used by the court to determine the child's best interests.' After a decision has been reached by the initial forum court, however,
.910 (1977); Arizona, 1978, Amz. REv. STAT. § 8-401 to -424 (Supp. 1979); Arkansas, 1979,
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2701 to -2725 (Supp. 1979); California, 1973, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150
to 5174 (West Supp. 1979); Colorado, 1973, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 14-13-101 to -126 (Supp.
1978); Connecticut, 1978, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-90 to -114 (West Supp. 1979);
Delaware, 1976, DEL. CODE tit. 13, 99 1901 to 1925 (Supp. 1978); Florida, 1977, FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 61.1302 to .1348 (West Supp. 1978); Georgia, 1979, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-501 to -525
(Supp. 1979); Hawaii, 1973, HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26 (Supp. 1975); Idaho, 1977, IDAHO
CODE §§ 5-1001 to -1025 (1979); Illinois, 1979, (reported at 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4042) (Sept.
11, 1979); Indiana, 1977, IND. CODE ANN. 99 31-1-11.6-1 to -24 (Burns Supp. 1979); Iowa, 1977,
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1 to .25 (West Supp. 1979); Kansas, 1979, KAN. STAT. §§ 38-1301 to
-1326 (Supp. 1979); Louisiana, 1978, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1700 to :1724 (West Supp.
1979); Maine, 1979, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 801 to 825 (Supp. 1979); Maryland, 1975,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 §§ 184 to 207 (Supp. 1979); Michigan, 1976, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
99 600.651 to .673 (Supp. 1979); Minnesota, 1977, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518A.01 to .25 (West
Supp. 1979); Missouri, 1978, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.440 to .550 (Vernon Supp. 1979); Montana, 1977, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to -125 (1979); Nebraska, 1979, NEB. REv. STAT.
99 43-1201 to -1225 (Supp. 1979); Nevada, 1979, 1979 NEv. STATS. ch. 85; New Hampshire,
1979, H.B. 743; New Jersey, 1979, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:34-28 to -52 (West 1979); New York,
1977, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 75a-z (McKinney Supp. 1979); North Carolina, 1979, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 50A-1 to -25 (Supp. 1979); North Dakota, 1969, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-14-1 to -26
(Repl. Vol. 1971); Ohio, 1977, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21 to .37 (Baldwin Supp. 1978);
Oregon, 1973, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 109'.700 to .930 (Supp. 1977); Pennsylvania, 1977, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2301 to 2325 (Purdon Supp. 1979); Rhode Island, 1978, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
15-14-1 to -26 (Supp. 1978); South Dakota, 1978, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-5-5 to -52
(Supp. 1979); Virginia, 1979, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Washington, 1979, 1979 WASH. LAWS ch. 98; Wisconsin, 1976, Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 822.01 to .25 (West
Supp. 1979); Wyoming, 1973, Wyo. STAT. §§ 20-5-101 to -125 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
Kentucky has adopted the jurisdictional grounds of the UCCJA, 1976, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.260 (Baldwin Supp. 1977).
8. Even though the Act is more concerned with the procedural aspects of interstate jurisdiction, it still affects some substantive, intrastate methods used in the adjudicatory process
dealing with information gathering. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-141, -142 (Cum. Supp.
1979); UNIFORM ACT §§ 18-19.
9. For intrastate custody matters, see generally UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT §§
401-410; H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS §§ 17.1 to .7 (1968); Gozansky, CourtOrdered Investigations in Child Custody Cases, 12 WiLLAmEm L.J. 511 (1976); Podell &
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the Act severely limits the power of the court of a second state to alter a
custody decree.'"
The basic purposes of the UCCJA are to avoid the jurisdictional competition marked by child abductions and forum shopping, to discourage continuing custody disputes which disrupt a stable home environment for the
child, and to promote interstate assistance in the adjudication of custody
matters." The provisions of the Act must be read and applied in light of
12
these basic purposes.

First, in order to accomplish its goals, the Act designates one court in
the country to assume responsibility for custody decisions affecting a parMnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 226 (1975); Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56
MARQ. L. REV. 51 (1972).
10. See UNIFORM Acr, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
11. UNiFoRm ACT § 1; Comment, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 745 (1978). Section 1 of the Act lisfsits specific goals as follows:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from
state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody
decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the
child;
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in
the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and hat courts of this state decline the exercise of
jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater
stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain
custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as
feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned with
the same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
12. UNIwoRM Acr § 1(b) and Commissioners' Note. Virginia, as is its policy when incorporating uniform acts into its Code, has omitted the purposes. Such omission, however, should
have no effect on the courts' interpretation of the law in applying the other provisions.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, another state which has not included Section 1 in
its statute, has specifically quoted the entire "Purposes of Act" section to clarify its intention
to construe the Act in accordance with the general purposes. Winkleman v..Moses, 279
N.W.2d 897 (S.D. 1979).
Virginia also deleted part of § 5 (referring to service of process by mail), § 24 (giving UCCJA
cases docket priority), and § 25 (severability clause) of the UNIFoRM Ac.
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ticular child. 3 Jurisdiction to modify the decree usually remains vested in
this court unless the child and his family no longer have appreciable ties
with the original forum state. 4 Selection of the court is based on its access
to information about the child and its family. Mere physical presence of
the child is not the determinative factor for jurisdiction.15 Possible jurisdictional conflicts between courts are resolved by deferring to the first court
to assume jurisdiction"6 or by application of the forum non conveniens7 or
"clean hands" doctrines."
Second, other essential information about the child which is out-of-state
is channeled into the custody court from less appropriate forums to assure
the broadest base possible for making a well-reasoned custody decision. 9
The Act provides for reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard" to all
persons claiming custody of the child' and encourages the appearance of
22
all parties and the child by payment of travel expenses, if necessary.
The final result is that all UCCJA states must recognize and enforce the
decision of the custody court by giving full faith and credit to a decree
reached in substantial compliance with the Act's purposes and provi23
sions.
H.

THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE

UCCJA AND THEI

EFFECT ON VIRGINIA LAW

A.

Jurisdiction

According to the reasoning of the Restatement, a state has jurisdiction
to determine the custody of a child who is:
(a) domiciled in the state,
(b) present in the state, or
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Aar § 3 and Commissioners'
Notes.
14. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-126, -137 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr §§ 3, 14 and Commissioners' Notes.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 3.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-129 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Aar § 6.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-130 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFoRM Acr § 7.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-131 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 8.
19. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-140 to -145 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNiFoRm ACT §§ 17-22.
20. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-127, -128 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr §§ 4, 5.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-133 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 10, which joins all claimants in one proceeding.
22. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-134, -142(B), -143(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr §§ 11,
19(b), 20(c).
23. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-135, -136 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM AcT §§ 12-15.
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(c) neither domiciled nor present, if2 the court has personal jurisdiction over
the parties contending for custody. '
This broad view of jurisdiction over custody matters is generally followed
in Virginia. The circuit court is not limited to decrees over domiciled
children; 25 rather it is vested with the power to decide all matters ancillary
to a divorce concerning "the care, custody and maintenance of. . . minor
children," which includes the decision of with which parent, if either, the
child will remain upon dissolution of the marriage. 21 Where divorce is not
at issue, the juvenile and domestic relations district court has jurisdiction
to conduct proceedings involving controversies over custody, visitation or
support, and situations in which the child has been abandoned, neglected
or abused.2
Under Virginia case law, the court of a minor's domicile has power to
determine custody. 2 Additionally, the child's mere presence in the state
constitutes a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over the child
for custody purposes, whether or not he is a domiciliary of Virginia. 2 At
the other extreme, the court in a divorce proceeding may award custody
of a minor child who is not domiciled, nor even present, in Virginia."0 If
the court has in personam jurisdiction over both parents, it has full authority to issue a personal decree binding between the husband and wife. 3
Under the UCCJA, the permissible grounds for the court's jurisdiction
remain the same, but the exercise of that jurisdiction is somewhat narrowed. The Virginia Code provides four general tests for determining
whether Virginia has jurisdiction to grant an initial custody decree. 2
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLcHt OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
25. See generally A. PHELPS, DOMESIC RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA (3d ed. 1977), §§ 23-1 to
-3, 23-5 to -7.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1979); see also § 20-79 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 1979). In custody, support or visitation cases,
"jurisdiction [of the juvenile and domestic relations district court] shall be concurrent with
and not exclusive of courts having equity jurisdiction, as provided in § 16.1-244 ... ." Id.
The initial right to determine custody is transitory, shifting with the abode of the child. White
v. White, 181 Va. 162, 24 S.E.2d 448 (1943). However, once jurisdiction is acquired by a court
in a divorce proceeding over the custody and maintenance of the child of the parties, other
Virginia courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction. Williams v. Woolfolk, 188 Va. 312,
49 S.E.2d 270 (1948); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-242, -244 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
28. See Rogers v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 355, 11 S.E.2d 584 (1940) (though such jurisdicton is not exclusive).
29. Falco v. Grills, 209 Va. 115, 161 S.E.2d 713 (1968).
30. Gramelspacher v. Gramelspacher, 204 Va. 839, 134 S.E.2d 285 (1964).
31. Id. at 844, 134 S.E.2d at 289.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides the grounds for jurisdiction:
A. A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters has
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The first, and most common, basis requires Virginia to be the "home

state" of the child; that is, the state where the child has lived on a continuous basis for the six months before commencement of the proceeding. A

six-month extension of this original home state jurisdiction is provided
when the child is taken from Virginia by a person claiming custody." The
application of this clear-cut, six-month standard35 has proven simple for
most courts."
In divorce cases involving children living continually with a parent who
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree
if:
1. This State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement
of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within six months
before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State
because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other
reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State;
or
2. It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future
care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
3. The child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been
abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent; or
4. (i) It appears no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites
substantially in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, or 3, or another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best
interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
B. Except under paragraphs 3 and 4 of subsection A physical presence in this State
of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on a court of this State to make a child custody determination.
C. Physical presence of the' child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Ac" § 3(a)(1). In the case
of a child less than six months old, his "home state" is the one in which he has lived since
birth with his parents, parent or person acting as parent. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-125(5) (Cum.
Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 2(5).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM ACT § 3(a)(1).
35. UNIFORM Acr § 3, Commissioners' Note; the Commissioners have adopted Professor
Ratner's finding that "[miost American children are integrated into an American community after living there six months." Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH.
L. REV. 795, 818 (1964).
36. Compare Howard v. Gish, 36 Md. App. 446, 373 A.2d 1280 (1977) and Thomas v.
Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975) with Wheeler v. District Court, 186 Colo.
218, 526 P.2d 658 (1974).
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is a domiciliary of Virginia, Virginia's jurisdiction remains unaffected.31

Where the child is presently a domiciliary of another state or has been such
within the six months prior to moving to Virginia, however, the court will
be unable to determine custody under the "home state" test merely on the
basis of in personam jurisdiction over the parents and/or the presence of
the child.3 1 It must find a basis under one of the other tests given in the
Virginia Code.3 9 Additionally, mere presence of the child will no longer
constitute sufficient grounds for assuming jurisdiction,"0 eliminating the
reasoning in Falco v. Grill.4' As in the past, however, the physical presence
of the child, though highly desirable, is not absolutely required for a valid
determination of custody. 2 If, for example, the child is away at summer
school, Virginia will still retain jurisdiction. 3
A second test for jurisdiction is that the child and at least one parent
have a "significant connection" with the forum state and that "substantial
evidence" exists in the state, making the exercise of such jurisdiction "in
the best interests of the child.""4 The "significant connection/substantial
evidence" test provides an alternative when there is no forum which meets
the "home state" requirement or when there are equal or stronger ties with
another state.45 Virginia's three present bases of jurisdiction4 will continue
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(B) (Cum.Supp. 1979); UNIFORm Acr § 3(b); see, e.g., Sagan
v. Sagan, 5 F~m. L. REP. (BNA) 2256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See, e.g., Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544
P.2d 402 (1975) (decided under the "significant connection" test of UNFoRM Acr § 3(a)(2);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A)(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1979)). See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(B) (Cum.Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Aar § 3(b).
41. 209 Va. 115, 161 S.E.2d 713 (1968). The Virginia court took jurisdiction of a child whose
parents, New York citizens, were killed in a car wreck in Staunton. Although a New York
court had given an ex parte guardianship order to a New York uncle, the Virginia court
granted custody to an uncle in Tennessee, basing its jurisdiction solely on presence.
Using chapter 7, Virginia could still qualify for jurisdiction under the "emergency" provisions of § 20-126(3). Whether or not the court should exercise such jurisdiction, however,
would still have to be determined under the other provisions of the chapter, e.g., §§ 20-129,
-130, -131, -136 and -137.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(C) (Cum.Supp. 1979); UNIFORM AcT § 3(c).
43. If the child is away at school for more than six months, however, Virginia must find
jurisdiction through the strong contacts of the second test. See Bodenheimer, The Uniform
Child Custody JurisdictionAct: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict
of Laws, 22 VAND. L. Rav. 1207, 1226 n.74 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer,
Legislative Remedy].
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A)(2) (Cum.Supp. 1979); UNIrFoRm Acr § 3(a)(2).
45. UNIFORM AcT § 3, Commissioners' Note; In re McDonald, 74 Mich. App. 119, 253
N.W.2d 678, 681 (1977). See also Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. App. 3d 457, 137 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1977) (wife and child were residents of Oregon, but California continued to have sufficiently strong ties to modify custody).
46. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
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under the "significant connection/substantial evidence" test, but they may
no longer be applied as freely.
Although the statutory language is very general in order to be flexible
enough to cover a wide range of fact situations, the test is expressly limited
by part (B) of this section which stresses that "physical presence in this
State of the child . . . is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction. . .. "I'
As the Commissioner's Note to the Uniform Act points out, "[Section 20126(B)] perhaps more than any other provision . . . requires that it be
interpreted in the spirit of the legislative purposes . . . . There must be
maximum rather than minimum contact with the state ...
[S]ubmission of the parties to the forum . . . is not sufficient without
additional factors establishing closer ties with the state.""
Typically, original jurisdiction under this test will be available in those
instances where the family has moved frequently with no state qualifying
for "home state" status." It will also apply where the child and one parent
have moved from the home within six months, but the other parent has
left also, leaving no significant connection with the state. °
In more complicated situations, the facts of the individual case must
show that Virginia is the most appropriate forum for deciding the child's
future relationships. An example of possible alternative jurisdiction would
be the one in which a great deal of the child's life had been spent in
Virginia before the family moved to another state for six months or more.
If the wife then returned to Virginia with the child, the Virginia court
might well have jurisdiction concurrent with the home state which would
allow Virginia to entertain the wife's petition for custody.' Although concurrent jurisdiction would exist, both states may not exercise it; therefore,
if the stay-at-home husband sued in his state within the six-month extension period, the less appropriate court must surrender its jurisdiction.2
Jurisdictional conflicts are to be avoided by the application of the Act's
priority-in-time53 and inconvenient forum rules. 4
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Aar § 3(b).
48. UNIFORM AcT § 3, Commissioners' Note.
49. Id. Cf. Mayer v. Mayer, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2749 (Wisc. App. June 29, 1979) where,
although the Wisconsin court retained jurisdiction as the home state because the stay-athome father filed proceedings within six months of the wife's departure, his move to Minnesota thereafter presented a question for the trial court to consider whether the child's ties to
Wisconsin had been sufficiently weakened for forum non conveniens grounds to apply.
50. UNIFORM AcT § 3, Commissioners' Note.
51. Id.; Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 43, at 1226-27.
52. UNIFORM AcT § 3, Commissioners' Note. See Mort v. Mort, 365 So.2d 194 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-129 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM ACr § 6.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-130 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM ACr § 7.
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In spite of these specific limitations, however, court decisions, especially
in some of the earlier cases under the UCCJA, have resulted in such disparate interpretations of Section 20-126(B) as to find jurisdiction when the
child and its guardian had lived out of the forum state for more than six
months55 and when the child had never lived in the forum state at all."
Although the rulings on this second test have been largely consistent with
the purposes of the Act, 57 much of the criticism leveled at the UCCJA has
55. See Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402 (1975), in which the Colorado court deferred
to California's jurisdiction, in spite of the fact that the child and his guardian had lived in
Colorado for more than the six months necessary to meet the home state requirement. The
significant connections found by the court included the child's presence in California for three
of his four years, the initial granting of guardianship in California, the access to considerable
information about the child by California social agencies, and the California domicile of the
parents. 544 P.2d at 406. With all of these connections, California was deemed to have the
substantial evidence necessary to determine who should provide future care, affection and
security for the child.
Additional factors existed in Fry, however, which rendered the immediate compliance with
the foreign decree in favor of the natural parents undesirable. The father had been convicted
of selling narcotics; the mother was being treated for heroin addiction; the child feared his
father; and the parents had violently tried to seize physical custody of the boy from his
guardian grandmother. 544 P.2d at 404-05. Because of these extenuating circumstances, the
Colorado court granted temporary custody to the grandmother, allowing her to retain the
child pending adjudication in California on the merits. The rights of the natural parents were
safeguarded by the court's condition that if the guardian failed to institute modification
proceedings in California within fifty days, the temporary order would terminate. 544 P.2d
at 408. Whatever the final action on the petition, however, the Colorado court stressed that
it would "stand ready to aid the [California] Superior Court, consistent with the letter and
spirit of the

. .

. Act." Id.

Although no specific statutory authority was cited for the Colorado court's course of action
other than its general equity powers, the result was reached in the spirit of the UCCJA by
its combination of "temporary protection of the child. . . with an offer of interstate judicial
cooperation." Bodenheimer, Problems, supra note 1, at 992. Professor Bodenheimer further
praises "[tihis venture in interstate cooperation [which] demonstrates how the Act permits
a court to safeguard the child and still prevent forum shopping by the loser in a custody
contest." Id.
Cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975) (Colorado father claimed
jurisdiction existed for the Colorado court under "significant connection" and "emergency"
to modify decree of child's home state, Kansas. A temporary custody decree was granted,
pending hearing on the merits, after which it was dissolved and jurisdiction was declined).
56. See, e.g., Nelson v. District Court, 186 Colo. 381, 527 P.2d 811 (1974) (blatantly misinterpreting "significant connection" element of § 3(a)(2), as giving the Colorado court jurisdiction to modify an Oklahoma decree, although the child was only visiting outside his home
state of Montana).
App. Div.
57. Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402 (1975); Vanneck v. Vanneck, -,
417 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1979); see generally Bodenheimer, Problems, supra note 1. Cf.
Carson v. Carson, 29 Or. App. 861, 565 P.2d 763 (1977) (although the Oregon court said there
must be "optimum access," it found the statute's language to be "practically impossible [to
apply in order] to determine . . . the more preferable forum." Id. at 865, 565 P.2d at 767).
But see Giddings v. Giddings, 228 N.W.2d 915 (N.D. 1975).
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been because of the vagueness of this test, 8 as well as the emergency test."
According to its critics, the jurisdictional standards of Section 3, augmented by the Commissioner's comments, give insufficient guidance, thus
allowing courts "to indulge their prejudices as freely as before.""0 However,
as more and more states enact the UCCJA and their courts perceive themselves as "links in an interstate-and even international-network of
courts,"'" the initial ambiguities appear gradually to be replaced by "a
substantial degree of unanimity and harmony""2 in the interpretation of
this section. Virginia will have the guidance of the many recent cases in
the last year or two which have defined more strictly the requirements for
establishing jurisdiction and, more importantly, for exercising it.3
Under the third test, a Virginia court may take jurisdiction in an emergency situation based solely on the physical presence of the child in the
state." When a child requires immediate protection, 5 such jurisdiction is
consistent with the traditional parens patriae role of the court to protect
children within Virginia's borders."6 The provisions of Section 20-126(A) (3)
make this an exceptional jurisdictional test with a very limited scope,
"reserved for extraordinary circumstances.

.

.

. When there is child neg-

lect without emergency or abandonment, jurisdiction cannot be based on
this [test]. '"6
Most reported requests for emergency jurisdiction so far have been at58. Comment, 48 COLO. L. REv. 603 (1977); Note, Family Law: Court's Adoption of Uniform Child CustodyJurisdictionAct Offers Little Hope of Resolving Child Custody Conflicts,
60 MINN. L. REv. 820 (1976).
59. VA. CODEANN. § 20-126(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 3(a)(3). See infra
notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
60. Note, 60 MINN. L. REv. 820 (1976); Comment, 48 COLO. L. REV. 603 (1977).
61. Bodenheimer, Problems, supra note 1, at 981.
62. Id. at 1014.
63. As late as 1977, only ten states had adopted the Act, therefore, until recently there has
been only a limited number of published appellate decisions to guide courts in applying the
Act's principles. See note 7 supra for current listing of states. See also Note, McDonald v.
McDonald: Michigan Applies The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 1978 DEr. C. OF
L. REV. 123, 124 n.10 (lists the sixteen cases interpreting the Act existing at that time).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A)(3), (B) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNmFoRm ACr § 3(a)(3), (b).
65. UNwoRm AcT § 3, Commissioners' Note.
66. The state's power to act for a child's protection and welfare has been recognized since
the seventeenth century in the English common law. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMasno
RELATIONS § 17.1 (1968). American courts have continued this tradition. See, e.g., Finley v.
Finley, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925), a leading American case in which Justice Cardozo
stresses the duty of the state as parens patriae to the incompetent and helpless. Accord,
Rogers v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 355, 11 S.E.2d 584 (1940). Additionally, statutes such as
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-246, -251 (Cum. Supp. 1979) specifically deal with the child's welfare
in emergency situations.
67. UtNwORM ACr § 3(a)(3), Commissioners' Note.
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tempts to modify another state's custody orders by circumventing the
requirements of the first and second tests."5 Occasionally, however, circumstances will exist where original jurisdiction may rightfully be invoked.
Abandonment, of course, will give Virginia its traditional power over the
child's custody." In other cases, the facts will have to show an actual risk
of danger, such as abduction or violence, to invoke jurisdiction under Section 20-126(A) (3). For example, W, after one of many marital quarrels with
H, leaves their home state with their child to seek refuge in Virginia. If H
follows to continue the feud, the situation between the parents might well
be volatile enough to require emergency intervention by the Virginia court
for the protection of the child. Virginia, of course, is unable under the Act
to determine custody under the first two tests, but it may award temporary
custody to W (or H) on the condition that she return the child to the home
state for adjudication of custody in the proper forum.
Similarly, if the danger to the child exists in the home state,' Virginia
could maintain temporary jurisdiction and initiate procedures to inform
the court with primary jurisdiction of the allegations and circumstances
concerning the child's well-being. 2 If the court employs strict time constraints,73 along with the expense penalties allowed by the Act 7 and the
requirement of substantiation of allegations, 7 the possibility of abuse
76
under the emergency test will be greatly reduced.
Finally, the fourth test supplies a residual jurisdiction when there appar68. See, e.g., Neal v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. App. 3d 847, 148 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1978) (mother
requested "emergency" custody because child's allergies had improved dramatically after
three-week visit in California); Young v. District Court,
Colo. -,
570 P.2d 249 (1977)
(father's general statements that child was "in bad circumstances" with custodial mother did
not qualify as "emergency").
69. Falco v. Grills, 209 Va. 115, 161 S.E.2d 713 (1968).
70. See Balkie v. Balkie, No. D-12-38-03 (Super. Ct., Orange County, Calif. Feb. 25, 1977),
a case decided on similar facts, discussed in Bodenheimer, Problems, supra note 1, at 993 n.

95.
71. Young v. District Court, - Colo. _,
570 P.2d 249 (1977); Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo.
128, 544 P.2d 402 (1975); Thomas v. Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975).
72. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-142, -143 and -144 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UmorORm ACr §§ 19, 20

and 21.
73. Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402 (1975); Zillmer v. Zillmer, 8 Wisc.2d 657, 101
N.W.2d 703 (1960) (decided before Act was proposed, but allowed temporary emergency

jurisdiction while requiring immediate return to the original forum state).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-130(G) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNiFoRM ACr § 7(g).
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-132 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 9.
76. But see Hudak, Seize, Run, and Sue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child Custody Litigation in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. Rv. 521, 547 (1974); Comment, 48 COLO. L. REv. supra
note 58 at 614-15; Note, 60 MIN. L. REv. supra note 58 at 832-35. These commentators feel
that the imprecise guidelines of the UCCJA, along with their initial misapplication by some
courts, hinder the accomplishment of the Act's purposes.
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ently is no other state which has jurisdiction or when another state declines
to assume jurisdiction because Virginia is deemed the more appropriate
forum and the child's best interests require Virginia to assume jurisdiction." If these prerequisites are met, the physical presence of the child will
be sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction."
Overlaying all the grounds of original jurisdiction is the Act's purpose
of avoiding "jurisdictional competition."" This purpose is manifested by
providing that Virginia cannot exercise jurisdiction if there is a pending
custody proceeding in another state unless that court stays its proceedings
in favor of Virginia."0 It is incumbent upon Virginia to determine if such
foreign state actions are extant;' if they are, Virginia must stay its proceeding and communicate with the foreign state court to resolve which
forum is more appropriate."
By placing the burden on Virginia to take an active part in the communication process, Section 20-129 helps carry out the UCCJA's goal of preventing interstate conflicts with the ensuing harmful effects on the child's wellbeing.
B. Modification of Custody Decrees
Although Section 20-126 establishes the bases for subject matter jurisdiction, it must be applied in conjunction with Section 20-137,14 which
prohibits modification of custody decrees by a second state as long as the
jurisdiction of the original decreeing state continues." The recognition
given to a decree of the original forum state by a sister state, although
closely interwoven with the modification aspects of custody jurisdiction,
will be discussed in part C.
1. Decrees Rendered by Virginia Courts
When a Virginia court acquires jurisdiction to award custody of a child,8"
that jurisdiction is continuous and exclusive, and its decree is never final
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNiFORM AcT § 3(a)(4).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNnuoRm ACr § 3(b).
79. UNIFoRM AcT § 1(a)(1).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-129(A) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFoRM ACr § 6(a).
81. The court must examine the pleadings, affidavits and registry of out-of-state decrees
and proceedings. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-132, -139 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNiFoRm Acr §§ 9, 16.
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-129(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFoRM ACr § 6(c).
83. UNIFORM Acr § 6, Commissioners' Note; see Paltrow v. Paltrow, 37 Md. App. 191, 376
A.2d 1134 (1977).
84. UNwoRM Acr § 14.
85. UNIFORM Acr § 14, Commissioners' Note.
86. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-107, -108, 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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until the child reaches majority. 7 This jurisdiction precludes any other
court in the state from modifying the original decree, even upon a writ of
habeas corpus." Once a decree is issued, the Virginia court retains jurisdiction to modify that decree even if the child is taken from the state."
Enactment of the UCCJA has no effect upon the intrastate workings of
Virginia's courts;" however, a court's power to modify its original decree
once the child has left the state with one parent will now cease unless the
circumstances continue to meet one of the four jurisdictional tests of Section 20-126.11 Again, the six-month "home state" test is easy to apply as is
its six-month extension." Considerably less definite, though, is Virginia's
ability to extend its power to modify its own decrees under the "significant
connection/substantial evidence" test. Once a child has been removed
from the state, the length of time that Virginia retains jurisdiction will
vary depending to a great extent upon the circumstances of the child's
removal and the amount of time passed."
According to the Commissioners' Note, another state would not achieve
modification status merely by fulfilling the "home state" requirements.
It must defer to Virginia as long as sufficient factors favor Virginia's continuing jurisdiction." The fact that Virginia had previously held a full
hearing to determine the best interests of the child may well be an important factor in prolonging jurisdiction."
87. Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 216 S.E.2d 20 (1975); Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631,
70 S.E.2d 417 (1952); Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153 S.E. 879 (1930); VA. Cone ANN. §§ 20108, 16.1-242 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
88. Williams v. Woolfolk, 188 Va. 312, 49 S.E.2d 270 (1948); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-244,
20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
89. Kern v. Lindsey, 182 Va. 775, 30 S.E.2d 707 (1944).
90. Adams v. Adams, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2776 (Fla. Ct. App., July 10, 1979).
91. See note 32 supra.
Colo. App. -,
92. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text. In re Zumbrun, 592 P.2d 16 (1979) (New Mexico continued its modification jurisdiction because it was the
child's home state at the commencement of the proceeding).
93. Professor Bodenheimer, in her study of child custody problems, argues forcefully that
modification jurisdiction should be flexible, allowing three or four years before cutting off the
original forum's jurisdiction as the facts necessitate, especially if the innocent parent has been
unable to locate the child. Bodenheimer, Problems, supra note 1, at 988-89.
94. UNiFORM Acr § 14, Commissioners' Note.
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-137 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 14.
96. Id. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. App. 3d 457, 137 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1977), where
California retained jurisdiction to modify its original decree although the mother and child
had subsequently lived in Oregon for five years. The court held that the child still had equal
or stronger ties with the original forum, as all other relatives were in California. But see Clark
v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 300, 140 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1977) (similar facts, but dissimilar
holding. Mother and child had lived in Oregon for five years, but this time California stayed
its proceedings on inconvenient forum grounds.); see also Schlumpf v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.

UNIVERSITY

OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:435

If the child re-enters the forum state to visit the noncustodial parent who
has remained behind a delicate question is presented. Does Virginia have
the right to modify its original decree in favor of its citizen if no other
action is pending in a more appropriate forum? A similar problem was
recently faced by the Oregon appellate court97 which concluded that since
a considerable period of time had passed (two years), the trial court should
decline to exercise its authority under the guidelines of the inconvenient
forum provisions." Virginia, likewise, could stay or dismiss the action of
the noncustodial parent under Section 20-1301 which provides "flexibility
to some of the Act's more rigid rules

. .

. [as] an excellent mechanism to

avoid jurisdictional conflict."' 1
When all claimants and the child leave the state, Virginia's authority
to modify becomes much more tenuous. It is not enough in itself that the
parties to the action subject themselves to the court's jurisdiction. The
court must be certain that no other state is a more appropriate forum to
decide the child's present and future welfare.'10
If a child is wrongfully removed from the state, Virginia's jurisdiction
would usually continue for a longer period of time than if lawfully removed,
which is consistent with the purposes of the Act.' 2 Other UCCJA states
could deny the wrong-doer access to their courts because of his conduct'
App. 3d 892, 145 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1978) (nine-year absence from state was too long to retain
jurisdiction).
Although the Act generally addresses problems concerning the unlawful actions of the
noncustodial parent, it is a two-edged sword to be used to prevent violations of custody
decrees by the parent who has been given the child. Where the mother had agreed to allow
visitation by the father as per the court ordbr, then had secreted the child in Minnesota for
twenty months, New York retained jurisdiction to modify its original decree. Policastro v.
Policastro, 5 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 1979).
97. Moore v. Moore, 24 Or. App. 673, 546 P.2d 1104 (1976).
98. Id. at 680, 546 P.2d at 1109. See also Policastro v. Policastro, 5 FAm. L. REP. (BNA)
2427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 1979); Clark v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 300, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1977).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-130 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFoRM Acr § 7.
100. Bodenheimer, Problems, supra note 1, at 997. See In re Kern, 87 Cal. App. 3d 402,
150 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1979), for an illustration of § 20-130's flexibility. Although the child had
lived outside the initial forum state for less than six months, the court of appeals refused to
allow the resident noncustodial parent to relitigate in California after she had wrongfully
retained the child after a visit from the father in Rhode Island.
101. See Campbell v. Campbell, Ind. App. -,
388 N.E.2d 607 (1979) (the court,
remanding for consideration of whether the trial court had jurisdiction under the Act, lambasted the lawyers and the lower court for not knowing and/or applying the Act at all).
102. UNIFORM ACr § 1.
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-131 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 8. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 280, 401 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1978), where, although the UCCJA had been passed
but was not yet effective, New York refused jurisdiction, frowning on the plaintiffs "lawless
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or on the additional grounds of forum non conveniens.'°"
Section 20-137, which prohibits modification decrees, must be read together with Sectin 20-126.o5 "Any other reading of the Act would subvert
its purposes by permitting a kidnapper to go into hiding for six months and
then seek modification. . . .The Act does not support an interpretation
which would encourage the very evils the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws intended to eradicate."'0 8
2. Decrees Rendered by Other Courts
Because custody decrees have traditionally been viewed as subject to
revision based on a showing of changed circumstances' 7 or on the welfare
of the child, 'SVirginia has displayed no hesitancy to modify a sister state's
orders.' 0 In fact, Virginia has apparently gone a step further, finding that
a foreign decree is susceptible to an independent determination by Virginia
courts, as "[w]e are not required to give full faith and credit to child
custody decrees of another state.""' By emphasizing that the welfare of the
child is the controlling consideration in a custody contest,' Virginia courts
retain wide discretion to modify foreign decrees.'
Under Section 20-137 of the Act,13 Virginia must now refuse to modify
a custody decree of another state unless Virginia meets the jurisdictional
tests of Section 20-126 and the original forum state either no longer appears
to have proper jurisdiction or has declined that jurisdiction to modify.''
self-help." 401 N.Y.S.2d at 439; In re Shalit, 4 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2035 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov.
1, 1977).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-130 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNiFORM ACr § 7.
105. UNIoFh ACr § 14, Commissioners' Note.
106. Bodenheimer, Problems, supra note 1, at 988.
107. E.g., Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 216 S.E.2d 20 (1975).
108. Semmes v. Semmes, 201 Va. 117, 109 S.E.2d 545 (1959); see also Portewig v. Ryder,
208 Va. 791, 160 S.E.2d 789 (1968).
109. See, e.g., Addison v. Addison, 210 Va. 104, 168 S.E.2d 281 (1969) (in which the court
felt free to change a final decree of the South Carolina court due to changed circumstances).
110. Osborne v. Osborne, 215 Va. 205, 213, 207 S.E.2d 875, 882 (1974) (holding specifically
that Virginia could order a change in child support payments without requiring a showing of
changed conditions).
111. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977); Branham v. Raines, 209
Va. 702, 167 S.E.2d 355 (1969); Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va. 259,49 S.E.2d 349 (1948); VA. CODE
ANN. § 31-15 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
112. See notes 110 and 111 supra and accompanying text.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-137 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNiFORM Acr § 14.
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-137(A) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNnoRM ACT § 14(a). See In re
Colo. App. _ 592 P.2d 16 (1979), where the Colorado court held that it
Zumbrun, did not have jurisdiction to modify a foreign decree. Even though New Mexico was not a
UCCJA state, it had initial jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the Act and it had
not declined jurisdiction.
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Once again, Virginia must follow the guidelines for determining whether
there are simultaneous proceedings in other states before exercising its
jurisdictional power."' Next, Virginia must apply Section 20-131(B)," 6 the
"clean hands" portion of the Act, and refuse access to a petitioner who has
either illegally removed or retained a child in violation of a custody decree." 7 If, after all these considerations, the court is authorized to modify
a foreign custody decree, it must still give "due consideration to . . .all
previous proceedings. ...
The Act's codification of the "clean hands" doctrine" 9 in modification
suits, Section 20-131(B),' 2" operates as a strong deterrent to a parent who
employs self-help measures. Not only will a court usually decline jurisdiction, except in an actual emergency,'' it may also impose financial penalties in the form of travel expenses and attorney's fees on a petitioner who
tries to contravene the policies of the Act.' 2
"Unclean hands" has provided the rationale for the courts to deny modification jurisdiction in cases where one parent removed the child from the
forum state pending the custody hearing,'2 where the Act had been passed
but was not yet effective,' 24 and where the wrongful behavior had taken
place in an international setting.'1 The doctrine has also been used to
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-129 (Cum.Supp. 1979); UNIFORM ACr § 6.
116. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-137(B), -131(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM ACr §§ 14(b), 8(b).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-131(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM ACr § 8(b).
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-137(B) (Cum.Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 14(b). Consideration
of the previous findings is not discretionary. "[Virginia] shall" use the transcripts and other
documents from its sister court(s) which have been preserved in accordance with UCCJA
mandates, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-144 (Cum."Supp. 1979); UNIFORM ACT § 21, and are to be
requested for use by states in subsequent proceedings, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-145 (Cum.Supp.
1979); UNIFORM ACr § 22. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-137(B) (Cum.Supp. 1979); UNIFORM ACT § 14(b)
(emphasis added). This information about the child and his history will give the modifying
court a clearer, more complete picture of the child and his relationships, especially in relation
to the out-of-state claimant. UNIFORM ACT § 18, Commissioners' Note. Cf. In re Verbin,
Wash. -,
595 P.2d 905 (1979) (Washington court held it could modify because original
forum court did not have all significant factors about child's best interests before it).
119. See generally Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L.
REv. 345, 357-74 (1953).
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-131(B) (Cum.Supp. 1979); UNIFORM ACT § 8(b).
121. The Act's language is "unless required in the interest of the child." Id. The harm done
to the child must be greater than the misconduct of the parent; otherwise, the refusal of
modification jurisdiction is mandatory. UNIFORM ACT § 8, Commissioners' Note.
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-131(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM AcT § 8(c). Cf. In re Schwander, 79 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 145 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1978) (although refusing to modify for lack of
emergency jurisdiction, the court reprimanded the petitioners for their "transcontinental
gameship," id. at 1021, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 330, and imposed a $1,500.00 penalty).
123. Barcus v. Barcus, 278 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 1979).
124. Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1977).
125. In re Shalit, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2035 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 1977) (New York
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grant modification status where both parents were guilty of child snatch26
ing.1

Although a majority of the more recent cases follow the Act's mandatory
refusal of modification jurisdiction because of "unclean hands," there is
still room for maneuvering by the advocate who is able to convince the
court that other principles outweigh the petitioner's misconduct. For example, in a recent California case, the appellate court took the position
that the UCCJA requires the question of unclean hands to be subordinated
to the primary consideration of the child's best interests.'27 This interpretation, unfortunately, leaves the individual judge with a great deal of discretion to decide jurisdictional matters.
C.

Enforcement of Other State's Decrees

Although the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution'2 appears
to require all states to enforce judgments rendered by a sister state, the
Supreme Court has qualified the literal language of the clause to exclude
judgments which are not final, but subject to modification by the court of
the original forum.' 9 As the court concluded in Halvey v. Halvey,'2 0 "a
judgment has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive or final effect
in the State of the [second] forum than it has in the State where
[originally] rendered."' 3 ' Therefore, since a custody decree can be altered
refused to hear petitioner, who had removed the child from its custodial parent, and granted
comity to the English custody decree); Woodhouse v. District Court, 587 P.2d 1199 (Colo.
1978) (Colorado lacked jurisdiction to modify English decree which had granted custody to
the mother from whom the father had abducted the child); Miller v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.
App. 3d 191, 138 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1977) (California was not the proper forum for modification
of Australian custody decree, where the mother had removed the child from Australia, unlawfully depriving the father of his visitation rights).
126. Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91 (1978).
127. Bosse v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 440, 152 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1979). The custodial
mother had hidden the child from the father, refusing visitation for almost three years;
however, the court found the interests of the child to be more important than the mother's
wrongful acts, so custody remained with the mother. Accord, Nelson v. District Court, 186
Colo. 381, 527 P.2d 811 (1974) (although the vigorous dissent is against bending "the processes
of this judicial system ... [for] one who violates a valid order." Id. at 384, 527 P.2d at 814
(Pringle, J., dissenting)).
128. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970), enacted by Congress to
effectuate the constitutional provision.
129. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944).
130. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
131. Id. at 614. Since its decision in Halvey, the Supreme Court has continued to allow
substantial deviation from article IV, § 1 in custody litigation. In May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528 (1953), full faith and credit did not have to be given to an ex parte custody decree. In
personam jurisdiction was required to bind a parent who had not had her day in court. Kovacs
v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958), held that a change in circumstances since the original decree
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by the rendering state's court throughout the minority of the child based
on changed circumstances, 3 ' other courts are likewise free to modify the
original decree without violating the full faith and credit clause. Because
a second court is not compelled to enforce a sister state's custody orders,
the individual states have liberally modified those decrees.'3 Virginia has
proven itself to be no exception."'
The drafters of the UCCJA, aware of this tendency to disregard a prior
court's holding, have provided a two-tier remedy to the conflict by codifying the principles of res judicata31 and full faith and credit.' Section 20135 sets out the res judicata effect of a custody decree,' 37 binding all the
parties once the court has met the jurisdictional prerequisites 38 and
3
strictly complied with procedural due process. 1
After a decree satisfies these requirements, recognition and enforcement
by other UCCJA states is mandatory."' Thus, under Section 20-136 Virwould vitiate its entitlement to full faith and credit, reaffirming the holding of Halvey that
a state which allows modification based on the best interest standard is subject to alteration
by other courts. Finally, in Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962), the Court found that Virginia's
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition was not entitled to full faith and credit, emphasizing
that the decision was neither res judicata under Virginia law nor was it rendered with the
child's best interests under consideration.
For a more detailed discussion of these four cases, see Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal
System, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795, 798-807 (1964).
132. E.g., Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 216 S.E.2d 20 (1975); VA. ConE ANN. § 20108 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
133. Not infrequently, the different states have reached opposite conclusions, often favoring the local resident. See, e.g., Stout v. Pate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954); Stout v. Pate, 209 Ga. 786, 75 S.E.2d 748 (1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 968 (1954)..
134. See notes 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-135 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNioRm AcT § 12.
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-136 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNwoRm AcT § 13.
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-135 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Acr § 12.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNwoRM Acr § 3.
139. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-127, -128 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFORM Aar §§ 4, 5. The plurality
opinion in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), requiring in personam jurisdiction over a
parent before termination of child custody rights has been discarded by the UCCJA, which
instead has used Justice Frankfurter's concurring view that personal jurisdiction over the
parent is not constitutionally mandatory. 345 U.S. at 535-36. See Bodenheimer, Legislative
Remedy, supra note 43, at 1232. The Act ensures procedural due process for custody claimants
by requiring that reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard must be given in accordance
with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-127 and -128 (Cum. Supp. 1979) before any parental or custodial
rights are cut off. Actual notice must be given if possible; otherwise substitute service is
permissible. Id.
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-136 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIORM AcT § 13. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Pincock, 99 Idaho 56, 577 P.2d 343 (1978) (full faith and credit extended to final California
decree, although the child had been in Idaho during the three years of litigation).
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ginia will effectively be giving full faith and credit to custody decrees of
sister states which have either adopted the UCCJA or similar jurisdictional
requirements, or which have taken original jurisdiction under conditions
acceptable to the Act."' The Act provides the additional mechanism of
allowing certified copies of out-of-state decrees to be filed in Virginia.'
Once filed, the decree is entitled to recognition and enforcement "in like
manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this State."'' In return,
Virginia's decrees will receive commensurate respect in other UCCJA

states.
There is one exception to the Act's recognition and enforcement mandate: punitive custody decrees do not need to be accorded the respect due
other out-of-state decrees.' Where an initial or modification order is made
without consideration of the child's best interest, but is purely designed
to punish one parent, the court is warranted in refusing to honor its sister
court's decree. "'
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although it would be unrealistic to expect the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act to be a complete solution to the complex legal and emotional problems of interstate custody disputes, the Act does provide a
141. UNEront Acr § 13, Commissioners' Note. See Kraft v. District Court,
Colo. 593 P.2d 321, (1979) (although Nebraska was not a UCCJA state, its decree was rendered
under similar provisions and was therefore entitled to enforcement). Cf. Clark v. Clark,
App. Div. _, 416 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1979) (New York court underscored the strong policy of
the UCCJA to favor sister states' custody decrees, even though in this case Virginia's assumption of jurisdiction was questionable). But see Wenz v. Schwartze, 5 FAM.L. REP. (BNA) 2813
(Mont..Aug. 1, 1979) (court took great pains to explain its refusal to honor a California decree
because of failure to comply with the notice and hearing aspects of the Act; however, it is
more likely that the court's real aim was to protect the child from sexual abuse by mother's
boyfriend).
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-138 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFoRm Acr § 15.
143. Id.
144. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-136, -137 (Cum. Supp. 1979); UNIFoRM Acr §§ 13, 14 and Commissioners' Notes. Although not explicitly excluded in the Act itself, the comments and the
underlying goals of the Act support such a conclusion. Bodenheimer, Problems, supra note
1, at 1006. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 119, at 370, 373-74.
145. Brooks v. Brooks, 20 Or. App. 43, 530 P.2d 547 (1975). Virginia has traditionally
viewed punishment of the parent as an unacceptable basis for determining custody. See, e.g.,
Moyer v. Moyer, 206 Va. 899, 147 S.E.2d 148 (1966). Cf. In re Settle, 25 Or. App. 579, 550
P.2d 445 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976) (the Oregon court
noted the distinction between a purely punitive decree and one which may have been based
partially on disciplinary considerations). This case is in line with Virginia, which has held
that where the child's best interests are served by a decree, the award of custody will be
affirmed in spite of the appearance of punishment of a parent. Rowlee v. Rowlee, 211 Va.
689, 179 S.E.2d 461 (1971).
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systematic approach for resolving many of the procedural issues which
may confront a forum court.
Under the Act, if a parent who has moved with his child from another
state petitions a Virginia court for an initial award, the court will first
determine whether it has jurisdiction over the dispute. Since mere presence of the parties is not enough in the absence of an emergency, the parent
and child must either meet the "home state" requirement or have
"significant contacts" with the, state. Even though Virginia may have jurisdiction, the court must still decide whether it is precluded from exercising its authority to render judgment because there is an action pending in
another state, the parent's conduct violates the "clean hands" doctrine, or
Virginia would be an inconvenient forum.
If there is already an outstanding custody award from the child's previous state, Virginia must recognize and enforce it if UCCJA standards
were met, and must refuse to modify it if the previous forum still meets
the Act's jurisdictional requirements. Even if the parent can convince the
court that Virginia is the appropriate forum to decide the child's future
welfare, the court will need the greatest amount of information possible
about the child, his environment, and his past and present relationships
to help make an informed, judicious decision. To this end, the provisions
of the Act encourage Virginia to initiate communications with the prior
forum state, which may include taking depositions or holding hearings in
the sister state, as well as the exchange of custody records.
As Virginia joins the thirty-seven other states which have enacted the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, it will help "interstate custody
law . . . continue to progress from the chaotic conditions that still prevail
in many jurisdictions toward a substantial degree of unanimity and harmony."146
Elizabeth CarringtonShuff

146. Bodenheimer, Problems, supra note 1, at 1014.

